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Risks and Resolutions: The ‘Day After’ for Financial Institutions—
A conference summary
by Carl R. Tannenbaum, vice president, Supervision and Regulation, and Steven VanBever, lead supervision analyst, Supervision 
and Regulation
The Chicago Fed’s Supervision and Regulation Department, in conjunction with DePaul 
University’s Center for Financial Services, sponsored its second annual Financial Institutions 
Risk Management Conference on April 14–15, 2009. The conference focused on risk 
management, headline issues, and recent financial innovations.
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This year’s risk conference focused on 
how the rapidly shifting ﬁ  nancial and 
economic environment is changing the 
way risk is being managed. This Chicago 
Fed Letter provides a summary of the rel-
evant research presented and discussions 
held by the bankers, supervisors, and 
academics in attendance.
Opening the conference, Ali Fatemi, 
DePaul University, described how rapid 
growth in the U.S. ﬁ  nancial sector in 
recent decades led to deregulation, in-
creased leverage,1 and overconﬁ  dence 
in the industry’s ability to manage risks. 
As we enter a new period of stricter reg-
ulation, he said, there is concern that the 
best and brightest workers will depart 
the industry in signiﬁ  cant numbers.
Carl R. Tannenbaum, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, noted that the U.S. 
ﬁ  nancial landscape has changed dra-
matically in just the past six months. 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve have been 
exceptionally active over this period. 
He said that we will be identifying and 
debating the lessons learned for years 
to come. These include lessons about the 
assumptions and applications of ﬁ  nan-
cial risk-management models, as well as 
lessons about linkages between credit 
risk and liquidity risk.
Amplifying Tannenbaum’s assessment, 
Charles L. Evans, president and CEO, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, out-
lined how an abrupt swing from extreme 
risk tolerance to extreme risk aversion 
had brought the ﬁ  nancial system to its 
current state. Financial stress is also tak-
ing a toll on the “real” economy during 
this business cycle; i.e., the turmoil on 
Wall Street is affecting what’s happen-
ing on Main Street. This has not always 
been the case historically. Gross domes-
tic product continues to contract, and 
unemployment is likely to continue to 
rise until 2010. 
Evans predicted that a number of reforms 
could ﬁ  gure into the resolution of this 
crisis. These include identifying systemi-
cally important institutions, rethinking 
how to price the safety net, and requiring 
higher capital—whether “exogenously” 
through higher regulatory minimums 
for capital balances or “endogenously” 
through putting debt holders at risk 
and exerting market discipline. 
CEO and chief risk ofﬁ  cer perspectives
William Downe, CEO, Bank of Montreal 
(BMO), argued that BMO has beneﬁ  ted 
from the diversity of its businesses, the 
strength of its risk infrastructure, the 
sound judgment of its staff, and its con-
servative risk culture (especially regarding To reduce systemic risk, policymakers are taking a hard look 
at “too-big-to-fail” and other regulatory policies, including 
capital requirements.
credit risk). BMO’s most important les-
sons learned concerned liquidity and in-
terdependencies among products and 
markets, especially the vulnerabilities 
of asset securitization. 
Under BMO’s risk-management pro-
gram, business lines own the risks, but 
additional lines of defense are provided 
by the corporate risk-management and 
audit functions. BMO has historically 
had strong risk functions for individu-
al risks, but has been working recently 
to strengthen communication across 
these functions. 
Richard Cahill, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, moderated a panel of three 
chief risk ofﬁ  cers: Joyce M. St. Clair, 
Northern Trust Corporation; Dominic 
Monastiere, Chemical Bank; and Kevin 
Van Solkema, The Private Bank. The pan-
elists discussed their organizations’ risk-
management structure and how they are 
responding to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
St. Clair said that at Northern Trust, 
risk policies, tolerances, and reporting 
ﬂ  ow through an extensive committee 
structure at the business-line and execu-
tive levels to the board of directors. In 
the current economic and political cli-
mate, the bank has institutionalized and 
globalized its incident management 
process, is focusing more on emerging 
risks, and is paying more attention to 
scenario analysis and stress testing to 
determine capital adequacy.
According to Monastiere, Chemical Bank 
has a decentralized service delivery 
system and a local decision-making struc-
ture but also centralized procedures, 
operations, and controls. Monastiere’s 
responsibilities include 15 major func-
tions covering the full range of ﬁ  nancial 
and compliance risks.
Van Solkema explained that The Private 
Bank began to implement enterprise risk 
management (ERM) relatively recently, 
in the summer of 2008. Consequently, 
ERM has rapidly evolved into a top-down 
and bottom-up framework, in which both 
the “tone from the top” and “escalation 
from staff and ofﬁ  cers” are critical to 
success. The board has shown its support 
by establishing a dedicated board-level 
ERM committee.
The “biggest shocks” of the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
cited by these panelists were the speed at 
which liquidity problems grew, the rapid 
decline in collateral values supporting 
loans, and the abrupt change in the pub-
lic’s perception of bankers (from positive 
to negative). Their most difﬁ  cult decisions 
were recognizing higher nonperforming 
loans and charge-offs, developing action 
plans for problem loans, and changing 
business strategies for reputational reasons. 
Supervisory lessons learned
Tannenbaum also led a panel on the 
lessons learned thus far through the 
bank supervision process. It featured 
Jon D. Greenlee, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System; Kathryn 
Dick, Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC); and Mark J. Flannery, 
University of Florida.
Greenlee reviewed indexes of stress in 
ﬁ  nancial markets, as well as those of de-
leveraging (i.e., reducing leverage, wheth-
er at the level of the individual, the ﬁ  rm, 
or the ﬁ  nancial system). The “originate-
to-distribute” model, where the origi-
nator of a loan sells it to various third 
parties, has largely been abandoned for 
the present. It may involve simpler struc-
tures once it returns. In addition, given 
the complexity of the ﬁ  nancial system, 
and the nature of the “shadow” banking 
system (comprising nonbank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, which are less regulated than 
banks), risks originated in unforeseen 
places and were transformed in unfore-
seen ways. Finally, Greenlee noted that 
incentives play a critical role in both 
risk-taking and risk management. 
Dick recounted key lessons learned at 
the OCC. They are as follows:
Underwriting standards matter;
Risk concentrations accumulate and 
need to be controlled;
Asset-based liquidity matters;
Systemically important ﬁ  rms need 
“state-of-the-art” infrastructure; and
Capital issues (including quantity, 
quality, planning, and procyclicality 
issues2) are paramount. 
She also covered an array of risk-man-
agement topics being explored by the 
OCC, including greater transparency of 
disclosures and the need to address 
excessive complexity of both structured 
products and organizational structures.
Flannery emphasized the impediments 
to risk management and risk supervision. 
Risk assessments differ across observers 
at any point in time. In addition, risk 
managers must identify outcomes that 
are unlikely to happen; therefore, they 
are wrong much more often than they 
are right. Expanding on Greenlee’s 
earlier point about incentives, Flannery 
said that power within a ﬁ  rm ﬂ  ows to 
those who are making money; i.e., it goes 
to risk takers rather than risk managers. 
Supervisors face all these challenges, plus 
political pressure if they try to limit 
currently proﬁ  table activities. 
The too-big-to-fail problem
Gary H. Stern, president and CEO, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
concentrated on the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
problem3 in his remarks. He indicated 
that the current ﬁ  nancial crisis has re-
afﬁ  rmed four lessons learned from ear-
lier crises: 1) the need to put uninsured 
creditors of TBTF ﬁ  rms at risk; 2) the 
value of preparing in good times; 3) the 
limitations of a resolution regime based 
on FDICIA (the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991);4 
and 4) the limitations of traditional 
supervision and regulation.
In order to reduce expectations of bail-
outs and reestablish market discipline, 
Stern said, policymakers must convince 
uninsured creditors that they will bear 
losses when their ﬁ  nancial institution gets 
into trouble. In addition, a credible com-
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on reforms that directly reduce the in-
centives that lead policymakers to bail 
out uninsured creditors (i.e., provide 
signiﬁ  cant protection for them). 
Stern suggested that, without sufﬁ  cient 
preparations, policymakers—even under 
a FDICIA regime—will end up supporting 
uninsured creditors of ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions perceived to pose systemic risk. 
Similarly, bank supervision has proven 
slow to identify risks and is prone to 
forbearance, as shown by its failure to 
prevent excessive lending to commercial 
real estate ventures. 
The TBTF problem was also the subject 
of a panel moderated by Elijah Brewer III, 
DePaul University. The panel featured 
David R. Casper, BMO Capital Markets; 
Ron J. Feldman, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis; and Robert A. Eisenbeis, 
Cumberland Advisers. Brewer began by 
raising the question of whether it would 
be truly catastrophic to allow large ﬁ  rms 
to fail, indicating that it had never really 
been tried.
Casper listed the potential adverse re-
percussions of allowing a systemically 
important institution to fail. However, 
preventing such failures also has a num-
ber of negative impacts, such as moral 
hazard (by seeming to reward irrespon-
sible behavior), distortions in competi-
tion, artiﬁ  cial incentives for growth, and 
costs to taxpayers. He recommended sev-
eral measures to limit TBTF: maintaining 
uncertainty around government inter-
vention (i.e., not stating explicitly the 
circumstances under which a govern-
ment bailout will be forthcoming); en-
hancing capital requirements and board/ 
senior management accountability; im-
proving supervision; creating a systemic 
risk regulator; improving transparency 
in credit default swaps and other over-the-
counter (OTC) markets;5 and improving 
resolution processes.
Feldman outlined the characteristics of 
an effective “macro-prudential” super-
visor. Such an entity would likely need, 
for instance, practical, hands-on knowl-
edge of institutions. In addition, to com-
plement its own monitoring, it should 
use ﬁ  rms’ own analyses of their exposures 
to counterparties and other spillover 
factors, as well as market assessments of 
risk, to the extent possible. Since it is hard 
to predict speciﬁ  c events that could pre-
cipitate a failure, more time should be 
spent on determining appropriate re-
sponses in the event of a failure.
Eisenbeis argued that the concept of sys-
temic risk has become broader and vaguer 
over time. There is no workable deﬁ  ni-
tion of “systemically important” that could 
be applied to a ﬁ  rm before an actual fail-
ure. In addition, creating a systemic risk 
regulator may not be a panacea and could 
produce conﬂ  icts of interest and other 
incentive problems. To limit systemic 
risk and TBTF, Eisenbeis recommended, 
among other measures, limiting excessive 
leverage and complexity and consider-
ing unwinding scenarios as part of the 
bank supervision process.
Regulation and capital
The future of regulation, including cap-
ital requirements, was considered by a 
panel moderated by Brian D. Gordon, 
senior professional, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago. The panelists were Anil K 
Kashyap, University of Chicago; Edward F. 
Greene, of Cleary Gottlieb Steen and 
Hamilton LLP; and David Palmer, 
Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.
Kashyap focused on capital regulation. 
He proposed that, other things being 
equal, capital requirements should be 
higher for banks that pose greater po-
tential systemic risk (i.e., larger banks 
and banks with a higher proportion of 
illiquid assets or of short-term debt). 
He also proposed that failing institutions 
should be forced to recapitalize, rather 
than depending on large amounts of 
government resources to prop them up. 
This could be done through “contingent 
equity,” a long-term debt instrument that 
converts to equity under speciﬁ  c condi-
tions. Banks would issue these bonds to 
private investors before a crisis. If trig-
gered, the automatic conversion of these 
bonds into equity would keep a weakened 
bank solvent at no cost to taxpayers.
Greene addressed likely changes in the 
regulation of key markets and instruments, 
as well as the concept of a systemic risk 
regulator. He expressed concerns about 
the effects of short selling6 during the 
current crisis. He also predicted changes 
in derivatives markets,7 such as increased 
use of central counterparty clearing. 
For securitization markets to come back, 
key issues are better allocation of risk 
to, and licensing of, loan originators, 
as well as enhanced disclosures. While 
endorsing the goals of having a systemic 
risk regulator, Greene emphasized the 
difﬁ  culties of implementing such a con-
cept in the current highly fragmented 
U.S. regulatory system.
Palmer concentrated on banks’ internal 
assessments of capital adequacy. Banks 
face a number of challenges in this area, 
including the need for fundamental 
processes to identify and measure risks. 
Stress testing is also important in esti-
mating capital needs and evaluating 
available capital resources. It should be 
used to challenge assumptions in existing 
models and to look at potential outcomes 
not captured in them. Given the inevitable 
uncertainties surrounding the capital 
assessment process, banks need to main-
tain strong capital buffers and have an 
overall sense of humility about what they 
understand and what they can measure. 
The future of ﬁ  nancial innovation
A panel on ﬁ  nancial innovation, which 
was moderated by John W. Labuszewski, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, featured 
David Marshall, senior vice president, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and 
Gerald A. Beeson, Citadel Investment 
Group LLC. Labuszewski detailed how 
his ﬁ  rm continues to innovate in a dis-
tressed economy, with particular emphasis 
on bringing central counterparty clear-
ing to the OTC derivatives market.
Marshall analyzed the underlying causes 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and related policy 
issues. A massive inﬂ  ow of capital from 
abroad led to low interest rates, under-
pricing of tail risk,8 overprovision of hous-
ing loans to nontraditional borrowers 
(e.g., those with poor credit histories), 
and overpricing of residential real estate. 
Financial innovation is always potentially 
disruptive, changing the distribution of 
returns in unpredictable ways and making 
tail risk events more likely. Marshall sug-
gested that policymakers take a serious 
look at this “dark side” of ﬁ  nancial inno-
vation, as well as managerial incentives, 
the disruptive effects of housing mis-
pricing, and (especially) measurement 
and containment of tail risk.
Beeson noted that much needed innova-
tion had occurred within the derivatives 
market in recent years. However, many of 
these innovations, in risk transfer and 
funding, have been shut down, perhaps 
permanently. In addition, continued im-
pairment of the securitization market will 
hinder risk transfer between providers 
of credit and pools of available capital. 
Past crises
William M. Isaac, The Secura Group, 
played a key role at the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the 
banking crises of the 1980s. He said that 
the current ﬁ  nancial crisis is much less 
severe than the earlier ones. The 1980s 
saw massive problems in the economy and 
thousands of bank and thrift failures. In 
the current crisis, however, a relatively 
manageable amount of potential losses on 
subprime mortgages has been ampliﬁ  ed 
by misguided regulatory policies, he said.
Isaac identiﬁ  ed several such policies. One 
is fair value accounting, which has caused 
assets to be marked to unrealistic, ﬁ  re-sale 
prices in the absence of a functioning 
market and thereby destroyed hundreds 
of billions of dollars of capital. Also mis-
guided, Isaac said, were decisions by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to 
allow “naked selling” (selling a ﬁ  nancial 
instrument short without ﬁ  rst borrowing 
it or ensuring that it can be borrowed) 
and to eliminate the requirement that 
short sellers could sell only on an uptick 
in the market. Isaac also criticized the 
Basel capital rules for exacerbating cycli-
cal problems through the use of backward-
looking models. Loan-loss reserving 
policies and FDIC insurance premiums 
have also had highly procyclical effects. 
Finally, Isaac argued that policymakers 
created a crisis atmosphere by the way 
large failures were handled and by using 
inﬂ  ammatory rhetoric when requesting 
emergency taxpayer funds.
Conclusion
Overall, the conference built effectively 
on last year’s meeting and reﬂ  ected the 
new directions both risks and policy re-
sponses have taken since that time. The 
sponsors were gratiﬁ  ed by the enthusiastic 
response to this event.
1 Leverage refers to the proportion of debt 
to equity (also assets to equity and assets 
to capital). Leverage can be built up by 
borrowing (on-balance-sheet leverage) or 
by using off-balance-sheet transactions.
2 Procyclicality refers to features that am-
plify the swings in the business cycle.
3 TBTF refers to the provision of discretion-
ary government support to the uninsured 
creditors of ﬁ  nancial institutions per-
ceived to pose systemic risk.
4 FDICIA mandated a least-cost resolu-
tion method but allowed a “systemic 
risk exception.”
5 An OTC market is a decentralized market 
of securities not listed on an exchange.
6 Short selling is the selling of securities or 
commodities that the seller does not yet 
have but expects to cover at a lower price.
7 A derivative is a ﬁ  nancial instrument whose 
characteristics and value depend upon 
those of an underlier—typically a commod-
ity, bond, equity, or currency. Futures 
and options are examples of derivatives.
8 Tail risk is a form of portfolio risk that 
arises when the possibility that an invest-
ment will move more than three standard 
deviations from the mean is greater than 
what is shown by a normal distribution.